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Abstract
This paper examines welfare eects of trade and FDI liberaliza-
tion in a model where several oligopolistic industries compete for a
common factor. With this general equilibrium eects, trade and FDI
liberalization has a contrasting eect. While it is unclear whether
trade liberalization benets each country, it necessarily raises world
welfare. When FDI is liberalized, the host country loses and the source
country gains, resulting in no eect on world welfare. These results
suggest that simultaneous liberalization of trade and FDI becomes
welfare-improving for the world.
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1 Introduction
Multinational rms are playing an important role in the modern world econ-
omy, and have a considerable impact on the host country's employment and
income, on the one hand. On the other hand, the choice between exporting
and FDI is a great concern from the source country's point of view. These
observations on multinational rms are recognized in the latest report of
UNCTAD (2015, p. 18), stating that `Indicators of international production-
production of MNE foreign aliates- show a rise in sales by 7.6 per cent,
while employment of foreign aliates reached 75 million. Exports of foreign
aliates remained relatively stable, registering a 1.5 per cent rise.' Then, a
natural question arises; what are the eects of liberalization of trade and/or
FDI when the presence of multinational rms is substantial?
To answer this question, this paper develops an oligopoly model that
allows a coexistence of trade and FDI, and examines the welfare eects of
trade and FDI liberalization on the host country, the source country and
the world. It is usually assumed in an oligopoly model that a factor price,
e.g. wage rate, is xed through the prot maximization condition of the
perfectly competitive numeraire sector. In this setting, trade liberalization
(tari reduction) and FDI liberalization (investment tax reduction) have the
same eect; these liberalization policies shift the prot from the host country
to the source country by lowering the source rm's marginal cost. In contrast,
supposing multiple oligopolistic industries that employ a common factor, the
factor price is endogenously determined so that the factor market clears. By
taking into account this general equilibrium eect, we show that the eects
of trade and FDI liberalization are quite dierent from those in the partial
equilibrium model. Concretely, we establish the following results. Trade
liberalization increases consumer surplus and prots in the host country, and
improves world welfare.1 If FDI is liberalized, the host country's rms lose,
1Welfare eects on the host and source countries are regrettably unclear. For this
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but the consumer utility in the host country and world welfare are unchanged.
These results illuminate the importance of general equilibrium considerations
in theoretical analyses and in practical applications.
There is an extensive literature on multinational rms, which is mainly
driven by the development of new trade theory in 1980s.2 While this liter-
ature comprises a variety of issues, the choice between exporting and FDI
receives much attention. Dei (1990), Horstmann and Markusen (1992) and
Brainard (1997) propose, in an oligopoly model, a so-called proximity-concentration
hypothesis of FDI, according to which FDI is preferred to exporting if the
xed cost to set up a foreign plant is small relative to trade costs. Extending
the model of heterogeneous rms by Melitz (2003), Helpman et al. (2004)
augment this hypothesis, demonstrating that the rm with a suciently high
productivity chooses FDI.3
One common assumption in these works is that the source rm chooses
either exporting or FDI. However, one can easily nd that some multination-
als undertake both exporting and FDI. Glass and Saggi (1999) are the rst
to model such a coexistence of exporting and FDI. Specically, incorporat-
ing an FDI subsidy into the oligopoly model of Dixit and Grossman (1986),
Glass and Saggi (1999) characterize the optimal FDI policies for the host and
source countries.4 The works of Glass and Saggi (1999, 2004, 2014) greatly
contribute to literature by assuming that multiple oligopolistic industries use
a common factor, the price of which is endogenously determined. Our model
heavily relies on their approach.5
reason, we pay greater attention to the eects on consumer surplus, prots, factor income
and world welfare, and the welfare eects on each country are briey addressed later.
Ishikawa et al. (2010) also employ the same treatment.
2Two earliest contributions in this eld are Markusen (1984) and Helpman (1984), each
of whom explains horizontal and vertical FDI, respectively. See Markusen (1995, 2002,
2011) for a comprehensive survey.
3The latest survey of FDI and multinationals is found in Antras and Yeaple (2014).
4Extending their own work to multiple source and host countries, Glass and Saggi
(2004, 2014) further discuss the eects and coordination of FDI taxes.
5It should be noted that we allow domestic consumption whereas both Dixit and Gross-
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In addition to the literature above, there is a growing interest in the
interaction between trade and FDI liberalization. Developing an oligopoly
model with free entry, Markusen (1997, 2002) nds that trade and FDI lib-
eralization has a quite dierent eect on welfare. Egger et al. (2004, 2007a,
2007b), based on Markusen's (1997) framework, numerically solve the more
complicated model than Markusen's (1997, 2002), and examine in detail the
welfare eects of trade and FDI liberalization. Incorporating service FDI into
a duopoly model, Ishikawa et al. (2010, 2014) show that FDI liberalization
has to be accompanied in order to ensure successful trade liberalization. Fur-
thermore, Liu and Qiu (2013) and Ahn (2014) extend the model of Helpman
et al. (2004) to address the eects of trade and FDI liberalization. Liu and
Qiu (2013) demonstrate that trade and FDI liberalization has a contrast-
ing eect on welfare, and Ahn (2014) theoretically point out a possibility of
welfare-reducing liberalization of trade and/or FDI.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 constructs a model, and
Section 3 states and discusses the main results. Section 4 concludes, and
Appendix provides a formal proof of the main results.
2 Model
Suppose a consumer of a host country named Home who consumes m+n  2
duopolized goods and a numeraire good, and has a utility function
m+nX
i=1
u(ci) + z; u
0() > 0; u00() < 0;
where ci; i = 1;    ;m+n is consumption of Good i, and z is consumption of
the numeraire good. Then, denoting by pi the price of Good i measured by
Good z, utility maximization yield the following inverse demand function:
pi = p(xi + x

i ); p
0() < 0; where xi and xi are output of the Home and
Foreign rms, respectively.
man (1986) and Glass and Saggi (1999) adopt a third-market model with no domestic
consumption.
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We divide m + n duopolistic industries into m  1 industries in which
the Foreign rm engages in both exporting and FDI and n  1 industries
in which the Foreign rm just exports. In what follows, we use subscripts
i and j to refer to a representative industry in the former and latter set of
industries, respectively. In all the duopolistic industries, one unit of specic
factor, named capital, is required to produce one unit of good. In addition,
the Home government levies an import tari t and an investment tax  , both
of which are of specic (per-unit) type. With these assumptions, the prot
of the Home and Foreign rms in industries i and j is dened as follows.
i  p(xi + xi )xi   rxi (1)
i  p(xi + xi )xi   [(r + ) + (r + t)(1  )]xi (2)
j  p(xj + xj)xj   rxj (3)
j  p(xj + xj)xj   rxj ; (4)
where  is the prot, r and r are capital rental in Home and Foreign, and
 2 [0; 1] represents a fraction of FDI. Eq. (2) states that the FDI incurs
Home capital rental r plus investment tax  while exporting involves Foreign
capital rental r plus tari t.
The rst-order conditions for prot maximization are as follows.
xip
0(xi + xi ) + p(xi + x

i )  r = 0
xi p
0(xi + xi ) + p(xi + x

i )  (r + )   (r + t)(1  ) = 0
xjp
0(xj + xj) + p(xj + x

j)  r = 0
xjp(xj + x

j) + p(xj + x

j)  r = 0:
Noting here that r +  = r + t must hold in order to ensure the interior
solution of  2 [0; 1], these equations can be rewritten as
xip
0(xi + xi ) + p(xi + x

i )  r = 0 (5)
xi p
0(xi + xi ) + p(xi + x

i )  r    = 0 (6)
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xjp
0(xj + xj) + p(xj + x

j)  r = 0 (7)
xjp(xj + x

j) + p(xj + x

j)  r + t   = 0; (8)
by eliminating r
The capital rentals are determined in the capital market-clearing condi-
tion in each country:
mxi + nxj +mx

i = k (9)
nxj +m(1  )xi = k; (10)
where k and k are the factor endowment of Home and Foreign, respectively.
While our model consists of six equations (Eqs. (5)-(10)) that determine six
variables (xi; x

i ; xj; x

j ; r and ), it can be further simplied by summing (9)
and (10) together:
m(xi + x

i ) + n(xj + x

j) = k + k
: (11)
Then, our model consists of Eqs. (5)-(8) and (11) in which xi; x

i ; xj; x

j and
r are endogenously determined.
We close this section by making comparative statics of the above model.
Totally dierentiating Eqs. (5)-(8) and (11), we have26666664
xip
00
i + 2p
0
i xip
00
i + p
0
i 0 0  1
xi p
00
i + p
0
i x

i p
00
i + 2p
0
i 0 0  1
0 0 xjp
00
j + 2p
0
j xjp
00
j + p
0
j  1
0 0 xjp
00
j + p
0
j xjp
00
j + 2p
0
j  1
m m n n 0
37777775
26666664
dxi
dxi
dxj
dxj
dr
37777775
=
26666664
0
0
0
 1
0
37777775 dt+
26666664
0
1
0
1
0
37777775 d;
where p0i  p0(xi+xi ) and the other derivatives are dened in the same way.
Following the standard oligopoly theory, we make:
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Assumption: xip
00
i + p
0
i; x

i p
00
i + p
0
i; xjp
00
j + p
0
j and x

jp
00
j + p
0
j are all negative.
Under this assumption, the eects of a tari are obtained as follows.
@xi
@t
=
n[ (xi   xi )p00i + p0i]p0j

;
@xi
@t
=
n[(xi   xi )p00i + p0i]p0j

(12)
@xj
@t
=
[n(Xip
00
i + 3p
0
i) + 2m(xjp
00
j + p
0
j)]p
0
i

< 0 (13)
@xj
@t
=   [n(Xip
00
i + 3p
0
i) + 2m(xjp
00
j + 2p
0
j)]p
0
i

> 0 (14)
@r
@t
=
n(Xip
00
i + 3p
0
i)p
0
ip
0
j

> 0; (15)
where Xi  xi + xi is total output of Good i, and   2[n(Xip00i + 3p0i) +
m(Xjp
00
j + 3p
0
j)]p
0
ip
0
j < 0 is the determinant of the coecient matrix of the
totally-dierentiated system. Analogously, the eects of an investment tax
become
@xi
@
=   1
2p0i
> 0;
@xi
@
=
1
2p0i
< 0 (16)
@xj
@
=   1
2p0j
> 0;
@xj
@
=
1
2p0j
< 0 (17)
@r
@
=  1
2
: (18)
From these outcomes, the eects on total supply are
@Xi
@t
=
2np0ip
0
j

< 0;
@Xj
@t
=  2mp
0
ip
0
j

> 0;
@Xi
@
=
@Xj
@
= 0: (19)
We now seek the intuitions behind these comparative statics outcomes,
which will be important in discussing the welfare eects of trade and FDI lib-
eralization. When the tari t is reduced, the non-arbitrage condition breaks
down and becomes r +  > r + t. Since this means that FDI is more
costly than exporting, Foreign rm i shifts production from the host country
(Home) to the source country (Foreign). This production shift lowers capital
demand in Home, and r falls. In contrast, Foreign capital rental r rises
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because capital demand in Foreign increases.6 Thus, the fall in r encourages
all the Home rms to produce more, and the rise in r discourages all the
Foreign rms' production.7
The eects of FDI liberalization can be interpreted in a parallel way.
When the investment tax  is reduced, it holds that r +  < r + t, and
Foreign rm i replaces exporting with FDI. This production shift puts upward
pressure on r and downward pressure on r.8 The resulting increase in r
induces the Home rms to contract outputs, and decrease in r induces the
Foreign rms to expand outputs.
It is noteworthy that `the increase in the source output exactly osets the
decrease in the host output, leaving total output of each industry unchanged.'
(Glass and Saggi, 1999, p. 319) This nding will play an important role in
welfare eects discussed later.
3 Welfare Eects
Based on the foregoing arguments, this section examines the welfare eects of
trade and FDI liberalization. Since the eects on welfare of each country are
ambiguous, we consider the eects on Home consumer surplus, rm prots
in each country and the factor income in each country, following the strategy
of Ishikawa et al. (2010).
6The eect on r is given by
@r
@t
=  

n (Xip
00
i + 3p
0
i) + 2m
 
Xjp
00
j + 3p
0
j

p0ip
0
j

< 0:
7As shown in Eq. (12), trade liberalization increases both the Home and Foreign rms'
output if demand is linear (p00i = 0). However, under non-linear demand, the sign of @xi=@t
and @xi =@t is ambiguous, but total output necessarily increases, i.e. @Xi=@t < 0.
8The eect on r is simply @r=@ = 1=2 > 0:
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3.1 Eects on Consumer Surplus
We begin with the eects on Home consumer surplus. Using the denitions
Xi  xi + xi and Xj  xj + xj , Home consumer surplus CS is dened by
CS  m
"Z Xi
0
p(Q)dQ Xip(Xi)
#
+ n
"Z Xj
0
p(Q)dQ Xjp(Xj)
#
: (20)
Then, the eects of trade and FDI liberalization are summarized as follows.9
Proposition 1. Trade liberalization raises Home consumer surplus if t <
2(pi   pj). FDI liberalization has no eect on Home consumer surplus.
The former part claims that the host country's consumer gains from trade
liberalization if the initial tari is suciently small. From (19), a tari reduc-
tion increases Xi but decreases Xj, and so it is generally ambiguous whether
trade liberalization benets the consumer. However, the eect on consumer
utility can be positive if the initial tari is suciently small because if t is
low enough, the Foreign rm has a stronger incentive to produce more af-
ter the tari reduction. Therefore, the positive eect on Xi dominates the
negative eect on Xj, leading to the consumer's gain. If, in contrast, t is suf-
ciently high, output contraction in industry j dominates output expansion
in industry i, thereby leaving the consumer worse o.
It is trivial that FDI liberalization has no eect on Home consumer surplus
just by invoking that FDI liberalization keeps Xi and Xj unchanged.
3.2 Eects on Firm Prots
Let us next address the eects on the rm prots in each country. We derive
the eects on the Home rms' prots, and then turn to those on the Foreign
rms' prots. Relating the comparative statics outcomes (12)-(18) to (1) and
(3), we nd:
9The proofs of all propositions are in Appendix.
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Proposition 2. Trade liberalization raises the prots of all the Home rms.
FDI liberalization lowers the prots of all the Home rms.
As indicated in (12), it is unclear whether the Home rm i increases out-
put as a result of trade liberalization.10 However, a tari reduction benets
Home rm i since its marginal cost, which equals r, denitely falls after trade
liberalization. In addition, a lower tari raises the prot of the Home rm j
by encouraging its production (see (13)) and reducing its marginal cost (see
(14)). That is, the decline in r caused by trade liberalization plays a crucial
role in the positive eect on the aggregate prots in Home.
The negative eects of FDI liberalization on rm prots can be inter-
preted analogously. Looking at Eqs. (16), (17) and (18), an investment tax
reduction decreases output of all the Home rms while it increases the Home
capital rental. Therefore both of these eects are detrimental to all the Home
rms.
While Proposition 2 focuses on the eects on the Home rms' prots, the
eects on the prots of the Foreign rms are now examined. The results are
more complicated, which are stated as follows.
Proposition 3. Trade liberalization raises the prots of the Foreign rms
that undertake both exporting and FDI, and lowers the prots of the Foreign
rms that just export. FDI liberalization raises the prots of all the Foreign
rms.
Whether trade and FDI liberalization is protable for the Foreign rms
is determined by its eect on output and capital rental. From Eq. (12)
and Footnote 7, it is unclear whether the tari reduction increases output of
10It is easily conrmed that the Home rm increases output if demand is linear.
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the Foreign rm i, but it necessarily reduces its marginal cost r + t, which
increases the prot. In contrast, as a result of trade liberalization, Foreign
capital rental rises and output of Foreign rm j declines. Hence, these eects
both lead Foreign rm j to reduce prots.
As in Proposition 2, the eects of FDI liberalization are straightforward.
As the investment tax is lower, all the Foreign rms produce more, and
Foreign capital rental falls. Thus, FDI liberalization allows all the Foreign
rms to increase prots.
3.3 Eects on Factor Income
In a conventional partial equilibrium model, no policy change aects the
factor income because it is equal to the xed factor supply. However, the
present model allows a change in factor prices, and hence changes in factor
income signicantly inuence welfare. Noting that r falls (resp. rises) and
r rises (resp. falls) after trade liberalization (resp. FDI liberalization), it
follows that:
Proposition 4. Trade liberalization lowers the Home factor income, and
raises the Foreign factor income. FDI liberalization raises the Home factor
income, and lowers the Foreign factor income.
Propositions 2, 3 and 4 oer two important implications. First, both lib-
eralization policies give rise to a conict of interest between the duopolistic
rms and the capital owner in the sense that in Home trade liberalization
(resp. FDI liberalization) benets the rms (resp. capital owner), but harms
the capital owner (resp. rms).11 Second, trade and FDI liberalization has
a contrasting eect on each welfare component. In particular, the Home
oligopolistic rms gain from trade liberalization, but lose from FDI liberal-
11Therefore, the welfare eect on each country inevitably becomes ambiguous as is shown
in Section 4.
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ization. Similarly, the Home capital owner loses from trade liberalization,
but gains from FDI liberalization. Combined liberalization of trade and FDI
is naturally called for in order to solve this income distribution problem,
which will be addressed later.
3.4 Eects on World Welfare
Home welfare is by summing up consumer surplus CS and national income
I, which is
I  mi + nj + rk + tm(1  )xi + mxi
= m(pi   r)xi + n(pj   r)xj + rk + tm(1  )xi + mxi
= mpixi + npjxj + r(k  mxi   nxj) + tmxi   (t  )(k  mxi   nxj)
= mp(Xi)xi + np(Xj)xj + (r   t+ )(k  mxi   nxj) + tmxi ; (21)
where tm(1   )xi + mxi in the rst line represents government revenue
from trade and investment taxes, and the third line uses (9). In a parallel
way, Foreign welfare W , which is equal to Foreign's national income, is
derived as
W   mi + nj + rk
= m(pi   r   )xi + n(pj   r + t  )xj + (r   t+ )k
= m(pi   r   )xi + n(pj   r + t  )xj + (r   t+ )(mxi +mxi + nxj + nxj   k)
= mp(Xi)x

i + np(Xj)x

j   (r   t+ )(k  mxi   nxj)  tmxi ; (22)
where the third line uses (11). From (21) and (22), world welfare becomes
W +W  = CS +mp(Xi)Xi + np(Xj)Xj: (23)
Dierentiating (23) with respect to t and  and using (19), we can establish:
Proposition 5. Trade liberalization raises world welfare, and FDI liberal-
ization has no eect on world welfare.
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From the ndings so far, trade and FDI liberalization necessarily leads
to a conict of interest within each country and across countries. However,
Proposition 5 suggests that simultaneous liberalization of trade and FDI may
be a solution to such problems. If both trade and FDI are liberalized, the
world enjoys an eciency gain, and thus it is possible for both countries to
gain from this liberalization through international income transfers.
Remark. We have unexplored the eects on each country's welfare since
nothing denite can be said. But, we now briey address how trade and FDI
liberalization aects each country. The following proposition concerns the
welfare eect of trade and FDI liberalization on each country.
Proposition 6. The welfare eects of trade liberalization on each country
are ambiguous. FDI liberalization lowers Home welfare, but raises Foreign
welfare.
It is no surprise that the welfare eects of tari reductions are unclear
by recalling Propositions 2, 3 and 4. On the contrary, we can claim that
reductions in investment tax are necessarily harmful to the host country and
benecial to the source country. The reason is that in the host country, the
rms' losses from FDI liberalization end up being larger than the capital
owner's gains, and exactly the opposite holds in the source country.
4 Concluding Remarks
We have formulated a model in which multiple oligopolistic industries employ
the same factor to examine the welfare eects of trade and FDI liberalization.
The model, which basically follows Dixit and Grossman (1986) and Glass
and Saggi (1999), is capable of considering the general equilibrium eects in
a simply way. It is shown that trade and FDI liberalization has a contrasting
13
eect on the consumer utility, rm prots and factor income in each country.
In addition, we have demonstrated that trade liberalization positively aects
world welfare, but that FDI liberalization has no eect on it.
While these results may provide a useful policy implication, they ad-
mittedly rest on a number of simplifying assumptions. Among others, the
assumption of a quasi-linear preference has allowed us to use the sum of
consumer surplus and national income as a welfare measure. It is undoubt-
edly restrictive to assume no income eect of the demand of oligopolistic
goods. In order to overcome this diculty, Neary (2009) proposes an `gen-
eral oligopolistic equilibrium' model in which full general equilibrium eects
and oligopolistic competition are combined.12 It is an interesting and im-
portant task to examine the eects of trade and FDI liberalization in such a
richer model.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Dierentiating (20) with respect to t and relating (19) to the resulting ex-
pression, the consumer surplus eect of trade liberalization becomes
@CS
@t
=  mXip0i
@Xi
@t
  nXjp0j
@Xj
@t
=
2mnp0ip
0
j(Xjp
0
j  Xip0i)

=
2mnp0ip
0
j[2(pi   pj)  t]

;
where the last equation follows from the rst-order conditions (5)-(8). Given
that  is negative, we nd that trade liberalization improves consumer sur-
plus, i.e. @CS=@t < 0, if 2(pi   pj)   t > 0. In contrast, FDI liberalization
has no eect on consumer surplus because Xi and Xj are unchanged.
12Colacicco (2014) provides a comprehensive survey on Neary's (2009) approach and the
subsequent works.
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Proof of Proposition 2
Dierentiating (1) and (3) with respect to t and  , and using the comparative
statics outcomes (12)-(15), we have
@i
@t
=
 
p0i
@xi
@t
  @r
@t
!
xi =  
2nxip
0
ip
0
j(x

i p
00
i + p
0
i)

< 0
@j
@t
=
 
p0j
@xj
@t
  @r
@t
!
xj =  
2xjp
0
ip
0
j[n(Xip
00
i + 3p
0
i) +m(xjp
00
j + 2p
0
j)]

< 0
@i
@
=
 
p0i
@xi
@
  @r
@
!
xi = xi > 0
@j
@
=
 
p0j
@xj
@
  @r
@
!
xj = xj > 0;
where the envelope property such that @i=@xi = 0 and @j=@xj = 0 is
utilized. The former two results suggest that trade liberalization raises all the
Home rms' prots, and the latter two results suggest that FDI liberalization
lowers them.
Proof of Proposition 3
Looking at Eqs. (2) and (4) and making manipulations similar to those in
the proof of Proposition 2, we obtain
@i
@t
=
 
p0i
@xi
@t
  @r
@t
!
xi =  
2nxi p
0
ip
0
j(xip
00
i + p
0
i)

< 0
@j
@t
=
 
p0j
@xj
@t
  @r
@t
!
xj =
2xjp
0
ip
0
j[n(Xip
00
i + 3p
0
i) +m(2xjp
00
j + x

jp
00
j + 4p
0
j)]

> 0
@i
@
=
 
p0i
@xi
@
  @r
@
  1
!
xi =  xi < 0
@j
@
=
 
p0j
@xj
@
  @r
@
  1
!
xj =  xj < 0:
These sign patterns lead to Proposition 3 in the main text.
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Proof of Proposition 5
Dierentiating the denition of world welfare (23) with respect to t and 
leads to
@(W +W )
@t
= mpi
@Xi
@t
+ npj
@Xj
@t
=
2mnp0ip
0
j(pi   pj)

< 0
@(W +W )
@
= 0:
4.1 Proof of Proposition 6
Home welfare is dened by W  CS + I, where CS and I are given by Eqs.
(20) and (21), respectively. Dierentiating this with respect to t and making
lengthy manipulations yield
@W
@t
=  mXip0i
@Xi
@t
  nXjp0j
@Xj
@t
+m
 
xip
0
i
@Xi
@t
+ pi
@xi
@t
!
+ n
 
xjp
0
j
@Xj
@t
+ pj
@xj
@t
!
+
 
@r
@t
  1
!
(k  mxi   nxj)  (r   t+ )
 
m
@xi
@t
+ n
@xj
@t
!
+mxi + tm
@xi
@t
=
mnp0j

[ (pi   r   )(xi   xi )p00i + (3pi   3r + 2t  3)p0i]
+
n(pj   r + t  )p0i

h
n(Xip
00
i + 3p
0
i) + 2mxjp
00
j
i
+
np0ip
0
j(Xip
00
i + 3p
0
i)(k  mxi   nxj)

+mXi + nxj   k;
from which the eect of trade liberalization on Home welfare is ambiguous.
In contrast, the eect of FDI liberalization is shown to be negative since
dierentiating W with respect to  becomes
@W
@
= mpi
@xi
@
+ npj
@xj
@
+
 
@r
@
!
(k  mxi   nxj)
 (r   t+ )
 
m
@xi
@
+ n
@xj
@
!
+ tm
@xi
@
=  m(pi   r   )
2p0i
  n(pj   r + t  )
2p0j
+
k  mxi   nxj
2
> 0:
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The eects on Foreign welfare can be analogously obtained. Dierentiat-
ing W  in (22) with respect to t and  , we have
@W 
@t
= m
 
xi p
0
i
@Xi
@t
+ pi
@xi
@t
!
+ n
 
xjp
0
j
@Xj
@t
+ pj
@xj
@t
!
 
 
@r
@t
  1
!
(k  mxi   nxj)
+(r   t+ )
 
m
@xi
@t
+ n
@xj
@t
!
 mxi   tm
@xi
@t
=
mnp0j

[(pi   r   )(xi   xi )p00i   (pi   3r + 2t  3)p0i]
+
np0i

h
 n(pj   r + t  )(Xip00i + 3p0i)  2m(pj   r + t  )xjp00j   2mpjp0j
i
 np
0
ip
0
j(Xip
00
i + 3p
0
i)(k  mxi   nxj)

+ k  mXi   nxj
@W 
@
= mpi
@xi
@
+ npj
@xj
@
 
 
@r
@
+ 1
!
(k  mxi   nxj) + (r   t+ )
 
m
@xi
@
+ n
@xj
@
!
 tm@x

i
@
=
m(pi   r   )
2p0i
+
n(pj   r + t  )
2p0j
  k  mxi   nxj
2
< 0:
Therefore, it is unclear whether trade liberalization improves Foreign welfare
while Foreign necessarily gains from FDI liberalization.
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